We use public transfers in the form of food aid to test for the presence of risk sharing arrangements at the village level in rural Ethiopia. We reject perfect risk-sharing, but find evidence of partial risk-sharing via transfers. There is also evidence consistent with crowding out of informal insurance linked to food aid programmes. Abstract We use public transfers in the form of food aid to test for the presence of risk sharing arrangements at the village level in rural Ethiopia. We reject perfect risk-sharing, but¯nd evidence of partial risk-sharing via transfers. There is also evidence consistent with crowding out of informal insurance linked to food aid programmes.
In the wake of Townsend's (1994) seminal paper, much empirical work has focused on testing perfect risk-sharing. Most tests involve investigating whether idiosyncratic shocks contain any information to explain consumption growth.
Results from a variety of contexts, such as extended families in the United States, communities in India and nuclear households in Ethiopia have failed to¯nd perfect risk sharing but do¯nd evidence of partial risk sharing (Hayashi et al., 1996; Townsend, 1994; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000a ). This in turn suggests that there might be a substantial role for interventions that might help households pool risk more e®ectively (Morduch, 1999) .
But the impact of such interventions cannot be assessed independently of existing informal mechanisms. Several standard transfer models predict that private transfers will be reduced if public transfers are introduced and there is some empirical support for this proposition as well (Cox et al., 1998) . When informal risk-sharing arrangements are present, public transfers to speci¯c households might be treated like positive idiosyncratic shocks and hence, shared across households. Alternatively, a formal safety net could undermine existing informal insurance: if informal arrangements must be self-enforcing, any scheme that changes the value of autarky relative to being in the scheme will a®ect the degree of risk-sharing. The result may be less informal insurance and even result in making some households worse o® (Ligon et al., 2002; Attanasio and Rios Rull, 2000) .
In this paper, we investigate public transfers in the form of food aid for farm households in Ethiopia to test for the presence of community risk-sharing arrangements. We¯rst test the predictions of the perfect risk sharing model: controlling for community resources, food aid should have no impact on household consumption. Under autarky, with no transfers between households, food 1 aid to some households should not a®ect consumption of other households. If autarky is rejected then this test provides evidence that transfers take place between households. We¯nd that this is indeed the case: both perfect risk sharing and autarky are rejected, suggesting partial risk-sharing using informal transfers. We also test a prediction of the constrained e±cient (partial) risksharing model with enforceability constraints: that in areas with public safety nets, idiosyncratic shocks may be less insured. We present evidence that this is indeed the case.
Theoretical Framework
Consider an endowment economy consisting of a community of N households, each household j with time-separable expected utility de¯ned over instantaneous utility u(c j ts ; z j ts ) in which c j is a single consumption good and z j ts are taste shifters, varying across households; both c and z are de¯ned across T periods t and S states s:Endowments in each period are assumed to be risky. There is no storage. Let us assume that all households in this community e±ciently share risk, without commitment or information constraints, so that the problem can be represented as if a social planner allocated weights µ j to each household and maximises the weighted sum of expected utilities (ignoring time preference for simplicity), subject to the community-level resource constraint in each period t and state s:Formally, at period 0, we can write this weighted sum as:
in which ¼ s is the probability of state s occurring. Denoting e j ts as the endowment of household j in state s in time t, and using c A ts and e A ts to denote aggregate consumption and endowments in the community in each state and time period, the community resource constraint in each period and state can then be de¯ned as:
More elaborate models including incomes, assets and production could be de¯ned, but the key predictions from a perfect risk-sharing model would not be a®ected (Mace 1991; Cochrane 1991; Deaton 1992; Townsend 1994). De¯ning ¹ st as the multiplier on the community resource constraint in each period and state, divided by the probability of the state occurring (¼ s ), then the¯rst order condition for optimal allocation of consumption from this problem for household j at period t can be stated as:
with u j c (c j ts ; z j ts ) denoting the marginal utility of consumption of household j . Since the pareto weights are linked to a single consumption plan and since ¹ st only depends on aggregate, not household consumption, this implies the standard perfect risk-sharing result: that the growth path of marginal utilities of all households is the same and that it is only in°uenced by changes in the aggregate resource constraint. We will use this framework to discuss the impact of food aid when risk-sharing is present.
This assumes that the risk-sharing arrangement is perfectly enforceable. There is a growing literature focusing on constrained e±cient contracts, enforced by the threat to leave the arrangement and return to autarky (Ligon et al., 2002; Attanasio and Rios Rull, 2000) . To characterise these arrangements, one could start from (1) and (2) above, but add an additional constraint for each household h, stating that in each period and state of the world, it must be in the interest of the household to stay in the arrangement rather than revert to autarky. These contracts still imply that risk-sharing will take placeso that changes in the community resource constraint will still a®ect the path of household marginal utilities. However, anything that increases the value of autarky relative to the value of staying in the contract will reduce the degree of risk sharing. This means that shocks to individual endowments and incomes may a®ect the ratio of marginal utilities across individuals, despite the presence of a risk-sharing arrangement.
ative shocks typically used in the literature such as illness, job loss and agricultural shocks arguably would satisfy this condition. In this paper, we use positive shocks, in the form of food aid given to individuals in the village, as one of the idiosyncratic income shocks. Under perfect risk-sharing, positive shocks should also be shared and not a®ect household consumption directly, but only do so through aggregate village resources. However, food aid is typically not randomly distributed so the assumption of cross-sectional independence of aid A j t with z j t and particularly, µ j is untenable. This is the standard programplacement problem of evaluating public programs. If aid is targeted to speci¯c types of households -e.g. those in poor areas or those headed by females, then without further controls for program-placement, the impact of aid on ln c j t would be inconsistently estimated in (4). However, if placement is determined by characteristics that do not change over time, then estimating (4) by¯xed e®ects removes the source of inconsistency.
We begin with an estimation of (5), and regress the logarithm of consumption on a set of time-varying community dummies D t and a set of time-varying taste shifters Z j t (which will be de¯ned below).# j is assumed to contain all timeinvariant taste shifters, the¯xed part of aggregate resources,¯xed placement e®ects and the pareto weights.
This regression is used to test perfect risk-sharing, using a set of variables measuring idiosyncratic events a®ecting income, such as illness, crop pests and livestock disease Y j t , as well as aid A j t . The coe±cient,¸; should be zero under perfect risk sharing, as should be ±, the coe±cient on idiosyncratic income. If the hypothesis that¸= 0 (or ± = 0), is rejected, then perfect risk sharing is ruled out. Does this then mean that no risk-sharing arrangement exists? Not necessarily, but (5) cannot clarify this point. To test this we can ask whether aid given to other people in the village a®ects a households' consumption. If so, this would provide strong evidence of some sharing arrangement. Furthermore, a prediction of constrained e±cient risk-sharing models, that a change in the value of autarky a®ects the degree of risk-sharing, can be tested by investigating whether the impact of a reduction in idiosyncratic income is higher in communities with substantial food aid compared to villages where there is little or no aid.
Data
The data come from three rounds of the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS), a panel data survey consisting of three rounds collected at intervals of about 5 months between 1994 and 1995. It covers 15 villages, representative for di®erent areas across the country, and a total of 1450 households were interviewed, across villages. The attrition rate in this panel is very low at about 3 percent per year. The survey has detailed information on households, including information on consumption, assets and income, as well as on shocks due to drought, pests and illnessd. Furthermore, it contains information on participation in food aid and food-for-work programs.
Consumption per adult equivalent 2 (in 1994 prices) is low: about 80 birr on average per month or $0.35 a day. The survey period was a good crop year on average, but a quarter of the villages were a®ected by drought, while diseases af-°i cted crops and livestock elsewhere. An average household loses several person days a month due to illness. Ability to cope with shocks is generally known to be quite limited, with life histories suggesting serious hardship linked to shocks due drought, illness, policy changes and other factors.
Ethiopia is one of the highest recipients of food aid in the world. The annual volume of cereal food aid has typically represented about 5 to 15 percent of production (Jayne et al., 2002) . Much of this is distributed throughout the country directly to households: more than half via food-for-work programmes and the rest via direct distribution. The stated aim is to target the poor and vulnerable. Self-targeting of food-for-work is rarely used, and wages are usually higher than opportunity costs of time, resulting in more people applying to work than can be accommodated. In e®ect, this means that the distinction between food aid and food-for-work may not be useful for our purposes, and is not addressed in this paper. Previous studies suggest that there is some persistence in the placement of food aid but also of relatively poor targeting. Households were asked to list all assistance received since the previous survey round, about 5 months earlier. On average 27 percent of households received aid in each round. There is some persistence in the food aid allocation: the correlation between receiving aid today and in the preceding period is statistically signi¯cant but not high at 0.15. Two villages received no aid at all while in ve of the villages, aid was only distributed once At the household level, about 50 % of households received aid at least once, 29% received it just once but only 5 % received it thrice. Finally, conditional on a village receiving aid, the percentage of households receiving aid is typically high -about 50 %. Overall, this suggests substantial variation over space and time, allowing us to perform the tests described earlier. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics, organised by whether households receive aid or not. Data de¯nitions are provided below the table (details in Dercon and Krishnan, 2000b) . It is striking that there is little di®erence between the characteristics of those who obtained aid and those who did not. Recipients have somewhat smaller household size, and su®ered more illness and livestock disease, but experienced better rainfall and fewer crop shocks. Aid receipts are equivalent to about 13 percent of total consumption for those receiving it. Mean consumption levels are similar for both groups, with high standard deviations. 2 The consumption data are based on summing all sources of food and non-food consumption, de°ated by a consumer price index, using the average household in the¯rst round as a base. It is expressed in adult equivalent units using nutritional equivalence scales based on WHO data for East Africa.
3 Sharp (1997)¯nds little evidence of area targeting. Participants are selected at the community level but aid is spread over a large number of bene¯ciaries. This is con¯rmed by Jayne et al. (2002) who also¯nd that the most important factor determining access to food aid was simply whether a programme existed in the area before. Consumption and aid per adult equivalent per month, in birr of 1994; aid is valued at consumer prices; illness days su®ered by adults per adult in the household; the rainfall index is calculated as rainfall in the preceding agricultural year relevant to the survey round divided by mean rainfall, minus one, and is measured at the nearest meteorological station -mean values based on typically about 20 years of data; below normal rain is de¯ned as rainfall below the long-term mean; crop shocks is a subjective (self-reported) index of whether main crops su®ered moderately or severely from any type of damage (including pests or weather related), where no problem equals 1 and 0 is total failure; livestock disease is a self-reported measure of whether livestock su®ered from serious disease between survey rounds, where 1 means no problem. Note that this means that for ALL shocks variables higher variables mean better outcomes, with the exception of illness.
(Note that this consumption level is measured after receipt of aid.) By and large, food aid recipients live in villages with higher mean consumption.
Results
Tables 2 and 3 summarises the econometric tests. We report the¯xed e®ects estimates, with robust standard errors. Idiosyncratic income determinants included are whether aid was received by the household as well as other indices of shocks, including the self-reported measure of shocks to crops, livestock disease and illness. These alternative sources of shocks are introduced as control variables, to isolate the impact of aid. Household composition and the sex of the household head (with changes mainly due to seasonal migration or death) are used as taste shifters. We begin with a test of the perfect risk-sharing model, with all aggregate resources summarised as time-varying village level dummies. We measure the impact of aid in two di®erent ways: as a dummy for whether the household received any aid, as well as the logarithm of the level of aid received. Table 1 , columns 1 and 2, suggest that the perfect risk sharing model is rejected in either case, since controlling for time-varying community¯xed e®ects, aid as well as other shocks a®ect consumption levels 4 . Column 2 suggests that a ten percent increase in aid increases consumption by 0.8 percent.
Next we test whether there is actually any risk-sharing taking place. To do this, we replace the community level variables by time-varying variables proxying changes in common resources. Deviations from normal rainfall levels were included, expressed as actual levels divided by long-term mean levels minus one. We allow for di®erent e®ects on resources from 'better than normal' rainfall compared to 'worse than normal' levels. For example, if savings are possible, but credit markets su®er from imperfections, then it is easier to smooth in good years than in bad years (Deaton, 1991) . Therefore the regression includes rainfall in general, as well as a separate measure of rainfall interacted with a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the rainfall index is below 0, or below normal levels. Hence, in bad years, the e®ect of rainfall on consumption is the sum of the coe±cient on rainfall and the coe±cient on rainfall interacted with this dummy; both coe±cients are expected to be positive. All the regression results con¯rm this: below normal rainfall has a signi¯cantly larger impact than above normal rainfall. However, both e®ects are substantial, consistent with large weather-induced°uctuations in consumption.
A further community characteristic included is whether more than¯ve per cent of the households from a particular village in the sample received food aid. Testing its e®ect gave a strongly signi¯cant, positive e®ect. However, it could be argued that in areas with poorly functioning food markets, where arbitrage happens slowly or not at all, the addition of substantial amounts of food aid to supplies in a village may simply have relative price e®ects, so that the impact measured by this food aid at the village level is merely a price e®ect, and 8 not evidence for risk-sharing transfers between households. To control for this possibility, we include a measure of the level of local food prices, compared to the average in the full sample: in short, as a control for local price movements beyond in°ationary trends in national food prices. Column 3 shows that this has a strongly signi¯cant e®ect, and lowers the impact of the village aid dummy, but the latter remains strongly signi¯cant. This would suggest that some risksharing is taking place and evidence in favour of the use of transfers between households. We explored this further using levels of food aid given to individuals and to the community. To construct a measure of the latter, we calculated the total volume of aid coming into the village per adult per month, using all reported levels by the households in the sample. Obviously, since we work with a sample of households (even if it typically constitutes about a quarter of the village), measurement error may bedevil this estimate. Even so, table 3, column 1 demonstrates that both individual and community level aid have a positive impact on consumption, but the latter is only signi¯cant at 14 per cent. However, we have an alternative measure of aid°ows that might be used as an instrument to tackle the measurement issue further. Our measure of food aid coming in is based on a question asking for receipts of aid between the survey rounds -typically about 5 months. However, in the consumption questionnaire, food aid received from public sources is recorded again with a recall period of 7 days. Since this is an independent measure of the food aid variable, obviously correlated with the measure from the consumption¯les, we can use this measure as an identifying instrument for household and community level food aid received. The results are reported in column 2, and as expected, both the size and signi¯cance of the coe±cients increases, especially the community level e®ect. In short, food aid coming into the village seems to be shared to some extent.
Finally, we test whether there is any evidence of pressure on informal risksharing arrangements due to the presence of food aid. To investigate this, we use the same regression as in columns 1 and 3 of table 2, but this time we include an interaction between idiosyncratic shocks that are clearly observable: viz. crop shocks and livestock shocks, and interact them with a measure of whether the village receives any food aid. The null hypothesis of no impact on informal arrangements from food aid is that the coe±cient on the interaction term of food aid with the idiosyncratic shocks, is zero, i.e. there is no additional information in this extra term to explain consumption (controlling for idiosyncratic shocks as before). Recall that in column 1 (table 2), there was evidence of crop shocks not being fully insured within the community. Column 3 (table 3) shows that the coe±cient on the interaction term of crop shocks with food aid is positive and signi¯cant at 7 percent, i.e. that there is a larger e®ect of idiosyncratic crop shocks in these communities than in those without food aid 5 . In fact, the evidence suggests that this lack of full insurance only occurs in villages receiving food aid, while for villages without food aid the coe±icient is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, as if in localities with safety nets some idiosyncratic shocks are not insured anymore. This result is con¯rmed (and signi¯cant at 3 percent) in column 4, where rainfall information is used as a direct measure of time varying village level variables. This supports the proposition that food aid crowds out local arrangements for insuring idiosyncratic risk.
Conclusions
We use public transfers in the form of food aid to test for the presence of risk sharing arrangements at the village level in rural Ethiopia. We reject perfect risk-sharing, but¯nd evidence of partial risk-sharing via transfers. There is also evidence consistent with crowding out of informal insurance linked to food aid programmes.
